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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION,

:

Case No. 2026 8

7th District Court No. CS-1
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT MEETS ALL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF
INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS

ALLEGED LACK OF JUDICIAL CONTROL

A.

Respondents maintain in their respective briefs that
the Subpoena Powers Act permits and even "encourages" abuses of
fundamental freedoms and that the Act authorizes a criminal
investigation

to proceed without judicial control.

These assertions are simply without factual support in
this case.

The Act requires that the investigation may not be

commenced except upon "application and approval of the district
court, for good cause shown."

This requirement, which

respondents attempt to minimize, clearly mandates initial
District Court approval for the investigation to begin.

Following the initial good cause showingf the District
Court retains control over the progress of the investigation when
a subpoena or other act of the prosecuting agency is challenged.
Respondents Thompsonf Conklinf Ziemski and Bowman suggest that
the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute, "deprives
the court of all ability to control the scope of the
investigation or to assure that the investigation proceeds within
the confines of the initial authorization11.
This assertion, which is essentially shared by all of
the respondents, simply does not square with the facts of this
case nor with what could happen in any other investigations under
the Act.
This investigation was initially authorized by Judge
Bunnell and proceeded until challenged by the respondents.

That

challenge consisted of motions to quash and other motions heard
by the Court.
District Court.

Some of the motions to quash were granted by the
That court was in no essential way deprived of

the ability to control the scope of the investigation or
prevented from assuring that the investigation proceed within the
initial authorization.

That control and oversight was the very

nature of the motions filed by the respondents.

The fact that

respondent's motions were reviewed by the Court and in part
granted shows that the authorizing Court does retain control over
the scope of the investigation and that the prosecuting agency
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cannot conduct an investigation without restriction or judicial
oversight.

Obviously there are remedies to a party who chooses

to resist a subpoena.

But, the fact that the Court granted a

motion to quash by holding a subpoena overbroad is not sufficient
reason to hold the act unconstitutional.
Every evidence gathering procedure from police
interview to court authorized wiretapping and search warrants are
subject to potential abuse and thus the ultimate exclusion of
evidence gathered pursuant to the investigative procedure used.
The potential that a search warrant may be too broadly drawn or
that law enforcement officials may search further than authorized
has never been considered sufficient grounds to hold search
warrant statutes unconstitutional.
The remedy for unauthorized police or investigative
action is suppression of the unlawfully obtained evidence, not
the invalidation of legislation authorizing the investigation at
the outset.

Clearly, the more reasoned approach is case by case

analysis not wholesale and unnecessary invalidation.
An example of this is approach is found in State v.
Ruggeri. 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, (Utah, 1967).

In that

case this Court held that when an accused or target is called
before a grand jury he must be warned of the charges against him
and failure to do so would be to violate his privilege against
self-incrimination.

This court held that the target of a grand

-3-

jury investigation must be warned of his targeted status and that
failure to do so would result in the suppression of the testimony
elicited from him.
The grand jury statute in effect at the time of
Ruggeri, supra, did not require the giving of a target warning,
yet this Court did not strike down the statute but instead took
the more reasoned approach and upheld the lower court's
suppression of the evidence.

The Court didn't rule the statute

unconstitutional because of potential abuse or because in that
situation the evidence was improperly gathered.
This is not to suggest that in the present case the
trial court was correct in its assessment that some of the
subpoenas were overbroad, but assuming arguendo any violation of
constitutional rights, the proper remedy is suppression not
invalidation of the authorizing investigative act.
Respondents Thompson, Conklin and Ziemski also suggest
that the court is deprived of an opportunity to review challenged
subpoenas in light of the investigation as a whole, and a person
actually accused is deprived of the opportunity to evaluate the
legality of the procedure followed.

These assertions also will

not stand analysis in that both the authorizing court and the
court where the evidence is to be introduced may review at length
the challenged subpoenas and evidence through motions to quash
and by motions to suppress filed at appropriate times.

-4-

Additionally, a party may, if charged, file a discovery
request pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, (U.C.A. § 77-35-16 to obtain the following information
and discovery:
77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery. (a)
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor
shall disclose to the defense upon request
the following material or information of
which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded
statements of the defendant or co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the
defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the
defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant,
or mitigate the degree of the offense for
reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which
the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant in
order for defendant to adequately prepare his
defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all
disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make
disclosure. . . .
For failure to provide this discovery the Court may
under § 77-35-16 (g) U.C.A. prohibit the prosecution from
"introducing evidence not disclosed."
B.

POWER OF COURT TO REVIEW SUBPOENAS

Respondents have also claimed that the power of the
authorizing Court to review the subpoenas is inadequate or
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illusory and fails to protect the rights of those under
investigation.
Of course, those under investigation in any criminal
investigation may protect their own rights only through
themselves, not through others.
U.S.

f

In SEC, v. Jerry T. O'Brien, 467

81 L.E.2d 615, 104 S.Ct. 2720 (1984), targets of a

Securities and Exchange investigation brought an action to
prevent third parties from complying with subpoenas issued by the
SEC.

The United States Supreme Court held that targets of the

investigation were not entitled to notice of issuance of
subpoenas to third parties.

Thus, a target may not seek

protection of his rights through third parties, but only as he is
subpoenaed to provide testimony or documentary evidence.
Respondents, Thompson, Bowman, Conklin and Ziemski
suggest that they are denied protection when material is sought
from third parties.

The Supreme Court in O'Brien addressed those

contentions directly:
It is established that, when a person
communicates information to a third party
even on the understanding that the
communication is confidential, he cannot
object if the third party conveys that
information or records thereof to law
enforcement authorities. United fftates v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619,
1624, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). Relying on that
principle, the court has held that a customer
of a bank cannot challenge on Fourth
Amendment grounds the admission into evidence
in a criminal prosecution of financial
records obtained by the Government from his
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bank pursuant to allegedly defective
subpoenas, despite the fact that he was given
no notice of the subpoenas. J&, at 443, and
n.5, 96 S.Ct. at 1624, and n.5. See also
Donaldson v. United Statesf 400 U.S. 517,
522, 91 S.Ct. 534, 538, 27 L.3d.2d 580 (1971)
(Internal Revenue summons directed to third
party does not trench upon any interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment). These
rulings disable respondents from arguing that
notice is subpoenas issued to third parties
is necessary to allow a target to prevent an
unconstitutional search or seizure of his
papers. . . . i£. at 272b.
The Court also held,
Two considerations underlie our decision
on this issue. First, administration of the
notice requirement advocated by respondents
would be highly burdensome for both the
Commission and the courts. The most obvious
difficulty would involve identification of
the persons and organizations that should be
considered "targets" of investigations. The
SEC often undertakes investigations into
suspicious securities transactions without
any knowledge of which of the parties
involved may have violated the law. To
notify all potential wrongdoers in such a
situation of the issuance of each subpoena
would be virtually impossible. . . . The
complexity of that task is apparent. Even in
cases in which the commission could identify
with reasonable ease the principal targets of
its inquiry, another problem would arise. In
such circumstances, a person not considered a
target by the Commission could contend that
he deserved that status and therefore should
be given notice of subpoenas issued to
others.
To assess a claim of this sort, a
district court would be obliged to conduct
some kind of hearing to determine the scope
and thrust of the ongoing investigation.
Implementation of this new remedy would drain
the resources of the judiciary as well as the
Commission.
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Secondf the imposition of a notice
requirement on the SEC would substantially
increase the ability of persons who have
something to hide to impede legitimate
investigations by the Commission, . . . Id,
at 81 L.Ed 626 30.
Respondents Thompson, Conklin, Bowman and Ziemski cite
People v, Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755f 290 P.2d 855 (1955) as standing
for the proposition that a non-subpoenaed individual should be
able to challenge a subpoena to another and have excluded
evidence taken from third parties.
The "Martin" rule as it came to be known was the law in
California but is not the law federally or in Utah.

Further the

Martin rule was abrogated by Proposition 8 in California and so
recognized in People v. Daan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Cal. App.,
1984).
The court held,
We hold section 28(d) abrogates
California's vicarious exclusionary rule, the
court correctly denied the motion to suppress
the evidence seized from Bryan and affirm
Daan's conviction and sentence." Id. at 233.
The Utah rule was expressed by this Court in State v.
Purcell. Utah 580 P.2d 441 (1978) where it was held that a
defendant had no standing to attack the search of a stolen
automobile in which he had no possession or proprietary interest.
Most recently in State v. Valdez, No. 18855, Sept. 11, 1984, this
Court held,
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We do not reach the question of whether
this search was permissible under the state
or federal constitution* Defendant concedes
that he did not own the car or the attache
case containing the evidence complained off
and he has failed to show that he had any
legitimate expectation of privacy in the
effects searched. Under long-established
precedent, he lacks any standing to complain
of the resulting search. E.g., State v.
Purcell. Utahf 586 P.2d 441 (1978); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
JLsU at p.2
Thus, respondent's argument falls on two separate
though related grounds.

First, in Utah the accused has no right

to challenge evidence used against him obtained from a third
party even if it were obtained illegally and second, assuming
suppression was a proper remedy, a suppression motion in the
appropriate court would be the appropriate remedy not wholesale
invalidation of the Subpoena Powers Act.
C.

EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-CQMPLIANCE REMEDY

Each of the Respondents allege that the pre-compliance
remedy of a motion to quash a subpoena is ineffective because
neither the subpoenas nor the Act gives notice to witnesses that
such a remedy is available.

The Act does, of course, require

notice of the right to counsel and counsel is presumed to know
that any subpoena issued by any authority is subject to a motion
to quash.

Utah Power and Light complains that some witnesses

can't afford counsel or won't think it is necessary because the
subpoena appears sanctoned by a court.
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Such complaints have no

place on the faacts of this case, where every witness ever
subpoenaed was represented by counsel, and did challenge
subpoenas, thus respondents are again attempting to assert the
rights of others in circumstances unrelated to this case.
However, their claims are also meritless.
It is axiomatic that any witness who voluntarily
appears and testifies in compliance with a subpoena has waived
any opportunity to challenge the subpoena.

If the witness also

chooses not to be represented, he has waived that right as well.
Thus, any witness who voluntarily appears and testifies in
complaince with a subpoena has waived any opportunity to
challenge the subpoena.

If the witness also chooses not to be

represented, he has waived that right as well.

Thus, any witness

subpoenaed under the Act knows or should know of the existence of
a remedy prior to complaince.
Appellant is aware of no setting in which subpoenas
issued by courts or by any investigatory body are required to
warn to subpoenaed individual of the availability of a challenge
to the subpoena through a motion to quash.

Yet such a remedy is

inherently available in any process in which subpoenas are used.
See e.g. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F.Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1972).

Thus, respondents' argument that notice is required to

make the

remedy effective fails, especially in light of the

procedures followed in this proceeding.
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D.

POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

Respondents insist that because the potential for abuse
exists that the Act must fall.

This reasoning makes no more

sense than to urge the invalidation of search warrant or wire
tapping statutes, where the potential for abuse also exists.
Respondents also claim that the Subpoena Powers Act is
deficient in setting forth sufficient procedural safeguards.

The

applicable case in this regard is, as noted in the State's
Appellant's brief, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946) .
The standards set forth in Walling, supra, are clearly
met by the Subpoena Powers Act.

Those standards set forth in the

State's brief are:
1.

The investigation must be for an
authorized purpose.

2.

The subpoena must seek relevant
information.

3.

The subpoena must be specific in nature.

The Subpoena Powers Act by requiring judicial approval
to commence the investigation and by the inherent right to
challenge.subpoenas as respondents did in this case, guarantees
the Walling standards will be met.

Respondents challenge the

"relevance'1 portion of the standard claiming that relevance may
not constitutionally be determined by the investigating agency at
the outset. Walling, supis, specifically provides otherwise,
holding,
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We think, therefore, that the Courts of
Appeals were correct in the view that
Congress has authorized the Administrator,
rather than the District Courts in the first
instance, to determine the question of
coverage in the preliminary investigation of
possibly existing violations; in doing so to
exercise his subpoena power for securing
evidence upon that question, by seeking the
production of petitioners1 relevant books,
records and papers; and, in case of refusal
to obey his subpoena, issued according to the
statute's authorization, to have the aid of
the District Court in enforcing it. No
constitutional provision forbids Congress to
do this. On the contrary, its authority
would seem clearly to be comprehended in the
"necessary and proper" clause, as incidental
to both its general legislative and its
investigative powers, ig. at 214.
. . .

Persons from whom he seeks relevant
information are not required to submit to his
demand, if in any respect it is unreasonable
or overreaches the authority Congress has
given. To it they may make "appropriate
defense" surrounded by every safeguard of
judicial restraint. 1£. at 217.
Thus the Supreme Court has held under circumstances
very similar to those involved in this case that the powers like
those granted under the Subpoena Powers Act are not
unconstitutional and the constitutional rights guaranteed all
citizens are sufficiently protected.

Further, the final

determination of relevance of a challenged subpoena is made by
the court whenever a subpoena is challenged.

Respondents1 point

misses the mark.
The Utah legislature, much like the Congress had in
Walling has declared "as a matter of legislative determination,
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that it is necessary to grant subpoena powers in aid of criminal
investigations."

§ 77-22-1, U.C.A. Respondents suggest that the

controlling cases in this setting are pannah v. Larche, 363 U.S.
420, 4 L.Ed 2d 1307 (1960) and Jenkins v. McKeithen. 395 U.S.
411f 23 L.Ed 2d 404 (1969).
The Hannah case essentially sets forth the standard
that investigatory proceedings, by an investigatory body, do not
require that witnesses be informed of specific charges being
investigated, identity of complainants or the right to cross
examination.
Commission,

The court held that since the Civil Rights
the investigating agency, did not adjudicate rights

it need not be bound by adjudicatory procedures.
In Jenkins, supra, the Court held that the procedures
of a Louisiana commission created to investigate criminal
violations in the field of labor management violated due process.
In Jenkins, one of the functions of the Commission was as
follows:
The Commission is required to determine,
in public findings,, whether there is probable
cause to believe violations of the criminal
laws have occurred. . . .
The findings are to be a matter of
public record. Id at 416, 417.
The Court further observed,
[E]verything in the Act points to the
fact that it is concerned only with exposing
violations of criminal laws by specific
individuals. In short, the Commission very
clearly exercises an accusatory function; it
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is empowered to be used and allegedly is used
to JLiajEl named individuals guilty of violating
the criminal laws of Louisiana and the United
States and to brand them as criminals in
public. I&. at 427-428. (emphasis added)
Comparing the Subpoena Powers Act to the statutory
scheme disapproved in Jenkins, it is obvious that the Act under
review by this Courtf does not require or even allow "public
findings" to be made by those investigating.

Nor is the

investigating agency be it the Attorney General or a county
attorney required to make probable cause findings as to whether
the violations of the criminal laws have occurred.

Also, despite

the urging of respondents the Subpoena Powers Act does not
authorize nor may it be used in an accusatory manner.

The Act

mandates none of the things which the United States Supreme Court
found objectionable in Jenkins, supra.
Respondents1 reasoning on this point is extremely
shallow.

They state that prosecutors serve "solely an accusatory

function "and since the Act allows accumulation of information
necessary to accusef the investigation must be accusatory.

This

argument misses the mark - no one's rights are adjudicated during
investigation or even upon charging.

When the charge is by

information a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate
at a preliminary hearing provides protection for the accused.
The need for the power to investigate criminal activity
is implicit in the statutory duties of the Attorney General and
the States 29 county attorneys.
Section 67-5-1, U.C.A. provides:
It is the duty of the Attorney General:
(1) To attend the Supreme Court, and all
-14-

courts of the United States, a prosecute and
defend all causes to which the state . . . is
a party.
Section 17-18-1, U.C.A. provides:
The county attorney is a public
prosecutor, and must: (1) Conduct on behalf
of the state all prosecutions for public
offenses committed within his county . • •
These duties cannot be properly discharged without
investigation.

To be sure that investigation should be within

constitutional guidelines and with a view to constitutional
protections.

The Subpoena Powers Act permits investigation and

fully protects the constitutional rights of the citizens of the
state.
POINT II.
THE ACT GRANTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
COUNTY ATTORNEY SUPOENA POWERS IN AID OF
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE OR OVERBROAD
Respondents Stott, Colby and Maxfield argue that the
United States Supreme Court's vagueness analysis inffolenderv.
Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983),
should be applied to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1,
et seq., (Rev. 1953), as amended.

The result they contend is

that the statute fails constitutionally because it doesn't
"establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement."
(Stott, Colby, Maxfield, pp. 36-37).

The argument is misguided.

The statute challenged by Edward Lawson, in Kolender, supra, was
§ 647(e), California Penal Code:
Every person who commits any of the
following acts is guilty Qt fliSQEdqrly
conduct, a misdemeanor: . . .

-15-

(e) who loiters or wanders upon the
streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business and who refuses
to identify himself and to account for his
presence when requested by any peace officer
so to do, if the surrounding circumstances
are such as to indicate to a reasonable man
that the public safety demands such
identification. (Emphasis added.)
At issue in Kolenderf supraP was whether the statute,
like vagrancy statutes before it, see Papachristou v.
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), described with sufficient
particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the
statute and avoid committing a crime.
Supreme Court found that it did not.

fColender, 361.
id., 361.

The

In dicta, but

still in reference to the California Criminal Statute before her,
Justice O'Connor, observed, as the respondents correctly point
out, that whenever a legislature, in a penal statute, fails to
provide minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement in its
application, the statute will fail for being vague.

The

application addressed refers to when to arrest a person for
violating a criminal law.

This is nothing more than what this

court has already said about the vagueness standard against which
statutes describing crimes in Utah must be measured.

See State

v.Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952); Bueller v. Stone, 553 P.2d
292 (Utah 1975); State v. Haag, 578 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978); State
v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979); State v. Owens, 638 P.2d
1182 (Utah 1981); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984).
Kolender and the Utah cases cited above do not address
themselves to criminal investigations or procedure.

They are

not, therefore, of any use in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 77-
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22-1, et seq.

Utah Code Ann. §

forbid conduct.

77-22-1, et seq. which does not

Neither does it penalize behavior.

in short, a penal statute.

It is not,

In merely authorizes the use of a

certain device in aid of criminal investigations.

Generally

speaking, it does little more than the search warrant provisions
found in Utah Code Ann. §

77-23-1, et seq.; that is, it gives

law enforcement a tool, with basic instructions on how it can be
used.

The vagueness test suggested by the respondents simply

doesn't fit these circumstances.
The argument of Stott, Colby and Maxfield that Utah
Code Ann. § 77-22-3 is vague, and thus void, because of its
secrecy provisions, misses the point as well.
is not a penal statute.

Again, the statute

The underlying reason for requiring a

certain degree of specificity in a criminal statute doesn't exist
insofar as Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3 is concerned.

Because

§ 77-22-3 does not prescribe conduct or penalize criminal
behavior a vagueness analysis is inappropriate.

A man of common

intelligence, See State v. Packard, supra, has no need to conform
his conduct to the requirements of § 77-22-3 to avoid committing
a crime and being punished for his acts.

Whether or not the

provisions of that section are as clear as they might be or
whether that section goes too far in accomplishing the
Legislature's stated purpose in passing Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1
et seq., that is, that;
as a matter of legislative determination
. . . [it is necessary] . . . to provide a
method of keeping information gained from
investigations secret both to protect the
innocent and to prevent suspects from having
access to information prior to prosecution
. . . .
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are not subjects of relevent inquiry insofar as vagueness is
concerned.
The respondents fail to articulate any harm that comes
from keeping secret what Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3 allows a court
to order be kept secret.

Respondents are protected if they are

ever charged with crimes detected as a result of any
investigation in which section 77-22-1 et seq. was used to gather
evidence, by discovery as allowed under Rule 16, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and by the affect of disclosure required of
the prosecution under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
These rights of respondents to discovery and disclosure like so
many of the others they contend are not specifically guaranteed
them by the language of the Act exist independent of any statute.
The sanctions attended upon the prosecution's failure to comply
with the rules of discovery and disclosure are obvious, specific,
severe, and effective.
practices criminal law.

They are well known to anyone who
Supression of evidence or sanctions

against its use and the possibile dismissal of an information or
an indictment if the abuse strikes at the heart of the defense
are adequate remedies to correct error and keep prosecutors from
engaging in prosecutorial misconduct.
The secrecy provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3 do
not pose a threat of any kind to the innocent and do not prevent
one charged with a crime from discovery or having disclosed to
him information covered by the same secrecy provisions when it is
critical to him and his defense.

Those same provisions do,

however, prevent witness and evidence tampering and preserve the
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integrity of an investigation so that culpable parties cannot
collaborate or concoct stories to confuse, divert or misdirect an
investigation.

See e.g. SEC v. O'Brien, supra.

As far as the procedural safeguards associated with
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2 are concerned, the statute need not
restate the Fourth and Fifth amendments to the Constitution nor
any of the Articles of the Utah Constitution, or the holding in
Miranda, or any other provision or case establishing a right to
which a criminal suspect or the target of an investigation is
constitutionally entitled independent of any statute.

Those

rights can be protected adequately by a trial court on motions to
supress prior to trial.
Stott, Colby and Maxfield argue that the provisions of
section 77-22-1, et seq. ought to be declared unconstitutional on
their face.

That position is merely a reiteration of arguments

made in other parts of their brief.

It builds on the error

inherent in their analysis of Kolender: their lack of a thorough
understanding of the real protections enjoyed by those to whom
subpoenas authorized by section 77-22-1 et seq. might be
directed; that is, the right to move to quash subpoenas because
compliance would be unreasonable, or because the subpoenas exceed
the scope of the authorizing order or cannot for some other valid
reason compel production or appearance, and the right to seek
suppression of the evidence obtained through the use of the
subpoenas if the evidence obtained results in criminal charges
and if the party asking the court to exclude evidence can show
standing and harm.

It also illustrates their myopic and naive

view of the role of the criminal prosecutor.
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KPlentierr suprar as discussed above, has no legitimate
place in the analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1, et seq.

The

void for vagueness doctrine simply does not apply in the case of
a statute which is not a penal statute.
The vehicle by which evidence is obtained, be it search
warrant or investigative subpoena matters little when evidence is
sought to be suppressed.

Indeed evidence obtained by search

warrant may be much more difficult to suppress than evidence
collected by subpoena for the very reasons argued by the
respondents to attempt to show that § 77-22-1, et seq. is
defective.

When a warrant issues, a magistrate has, upon sworn

submission, already determined that the required probable cause
for its issuance exists.

Defendant clearly has no standing to

object to the issuance or execution of a search warrant prior to
issuance or exeuction.

The resultint seizure of evidence

pursuant to a warrant is rarely controvertable.

Evidence

gathered under subpoena, however, may be more vulnerable because
determining whether compliance is reasonable can be done before
any evidence is gathered.

This process is, despite the

respondents arguments, an adequate and effective deterrent to any
possible abuse by the prosecution.
There is, simply, nothing about the Act that encourages
a prosecutor to abuse it, given the protections described above.
A prosecutor who seeks authorization from a court for the purpose
of using the Subpoena Powers Act to conduct an investigation must
keep in mind when making the showing required that his subsequent
acts will be, as they were in this case, subject to close
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scrutiny.

Wild and irresponsible claims, reckless disregard for

the truth, carelessly drafted affidavits filed in support of the
request for authority to use the subpoenaes authorized by the
Act, will be exposed at some time in the process.

They are

likely to be exposed to the first reviewing judge asked to quash
a subpoena.

Every subpoena issued and every item of evidence

gathered must be reviewed for whether it will withstand a
defendant's effort to keep it from being used at trial.
Statements taken from witness and targets must be taken with a
view to their ultimate utility in any subsequent proceeding.
Rights warnings and making sure that a witnesses rights are
observed are the only means a prosecutor has of protecting his
evidence so that it will have some value to him later on.

All of

this and more the prosecutor and investigator must do in order to
avoid coming to the end of an investigation and finding
themselves with information that might point to criminal conduct
but which is worthless because it is inadmissible as evidence in
a criminal trial.

For a prosecutor or investigator to do less

than observe the rule scrupulously would be contrary to his own
interest and would be foolhardy.
For respondents to assert that prosecutors have a
"sworn duty to obtain convictions and put people in jail" (Stott,
Colby and Maxfield brief, p.24, 48) and to say that "in their
zeal to fulfill this function all of these prosecutors cannot
reasonably to apply [the Subpoena Powers Act] in a way that
safeguards Constitutional rights" besides being statements that
contradict themselves, betrays respondents' ingnorance of the
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prosecutor's function.

It is a futher example of their confused

thinking when it comes to criminal matters.
In case after case prosecutors are reminded that their
duty is not conviction but to see that justice is done.

In

Berqer v. United statesr 55 S,Ct. 629, 633 (1935) Justice
Sutherland observed insofar as the United States Attorney's
Office was concerned:
The United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the two-fold
aid of which is that guilt shall escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor - indeed he should do
so. But while he may strike hard blows he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones.
Justice Sutherland's observation is no less true of a
state prosecutor whether he be an employee of the Attorney
General's Office or of a County Attorney.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Ethical Considerations 7-13, also reminds the public prosecutor
of his duties and responsibilities:
The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice not
merely to convict. This special duty exist
because; (1) the prosecutor represents the
sovereign and therefore should use restraint
in the discretionary exercise of governmental
powers, such as in the selection of cases to
prosecute; (2) the prosecutor represents the
sovereign and therefore should use restrain
in the discretionary exercise of governmental
powers, such as in the selection of cases to
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prosecute; (3) during trial the prosecutor is
not only an advocate but he also may make
decisions normally made by an individual
client, and those effecting the public
interest should be fair to all; and (4) in
our system of criminal justice the accused is
to be given the benefit of all reasonable
doubts. With respect to evidence and
witnesses the prosecutor has a
responsibilities different from those of a
lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor
should make timely disclosure to the defense
of available evidence known to him that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate
the degree of the offense, or reduce the
punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not
intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
merely because he believes it will damage the
prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
Overreaching on the part of a prosecutor is counter to
his own interest because it can result in severe sanctions,
including the dismissal of his case.
When looked at in a true light the respondents'
arguments built as they are on the notation that the possibility
exists that the Subpoena Powers Act will be abused because of the
dangerous proclivity of public prosecutors to violate the rights
of citizens at will without penalty or fear of consequence, and
on their belief that because the Act does not specifically spell
out or incorporate the limitations on investigations and
prosecutions that exist independent of the Act, it is somehow
defective, are truly transparent.
B.
Respondents Utah Power and Light Company (UP&L) also
argue that section 77-22-2 should be declared unconstitutionally
vague.

UP&L relies on KPlentier, supra, and cites Smith v.

Goguen. 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (involving Massachusetts General
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Laws Annotated c. 264, section 5, a flag mis-use statute making
it punishable by a fine of not less than ten nor more than one
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both, for anyone to publically mutilate, trample upon, defame or
treat contemptously the flag of the United States.) , and Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (involving two Rockford,
Illinois city ordinances.

One, an anti-picketing ordinance,

punished as disorderly conduct picketing or demonstrating on a
public within 150 feet of a primary or secondary school in
session.

The other..

anti-noise ordinance, made it a crime for

anyone to "willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or
diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace and good
order" of a school or class in session), in support of the
proposition that penal statutes are not favored constitutionally
when they lack the specificity necessary to prevent those who
enforce them from having too great a latitude in determining what
is or isn't the conduct prohibited by the statute.

It is obvious

in every case that the Supreme Court was talking about
substantive criminal statutes, not statutes involving criminal
procedure or, as in this case, statutes giving the government
nothing more than investigative devices to use in detecting
crime.

They have no application in analyzing the Subpoena Powers

Act a statute that makes nothing criminal.
UP&L acknowledges the weakness in their argument by
admitting the distinction between this case and the cases they
rely on as authority.
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UP&L's assertion that Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2 gives
prosecutors "carte blanche" to set their own standards for
criminal procedure thus making it unconstitutionally vaguef is
not supported by the language of the Act, the history of its use
or, common sense.

The Subpoena Powers Act does contain

procedural requirements that are spelled out clearly on the face
of the statute; in order for the Attorney General or a county
attorney to make use of the Acthe must first file an affidavit in
the District Court in sufficient detail to allow that court to
determine whether good cause exists to authorize the use of the
subpoena power in furtherance of his investigation.

Once

authorized, the Attorney General or county attorney must still
issue subpoenas to specific people for enumerated items or
evidence.

The District Court has inherent authority to grant

equitable relief, that is to quash subpoenas if compliance
therewith would be unreasonable.

The court that authorizes the

use of the subpoenaes under section 77-22-2 can, if it chooses,
there being nothing in this statute to prevent it, monitor the
investigation on its motion and at will.
The Court that authorizes the use of subpoenas under
Section 77-22-2 can, if it chooses, there being nothing in the
statute to prevent it, monitor the investigation on its own
motion and at will.

The Attorney General and County Attorneys do

not, therefore, have the unlimited or unfettered control over the
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process permitted by the Subpoena Powers Act, that Utah Power and
Light would like the Court to think they have.
no "carte blanche."
point.

There simply is

This proceeding is ample evidence of that

The Subpoena Powrs Act is no more dangerous than the

search warrant provisions of the Act.

Every procedural safeguard

available in the case of a search warrant both before and after
its execution, including prior review by a magistrate, is
available in the case of an investigative subpoena before
anyone's rights are ever put in jeopardy.

The review by a

magistrate can be accomplished on a motion to quash any subpoena
issued under authority of the Act.

The statute and those who use

it simply are not the boogie man respondents fear.
POINT III
THERE IS NO STRICT PROHIBITION AGAINST THE
USE OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN A CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION IN A COMPANION CIVIL ACTION.
The prohibition against the automatic disclosure of
matters occurring before a federal grand jury for use in civil
actions that was announced by the United States Supreme Court in
United SUtgs v. Sells Engineering, 103 S.Ct. 3133 (1983), and
the prohibition against disclosing matters occurring before a
federal grand jury solely for the purpose of determining a
target's civil liability, United States v. Bagqott, 103 S.Ct.
3164 (1983), is limited in application to matters arising under
Rule 6, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a provision which
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has no counterpart in Utah criminal practicer and is restricted
in any case to matters involving grand juries.

Those cases have

no application in the matter before this Court.
Respondent Utah Power and Light states that it is the
general rule that "evidence gathered in a criminal investigation
cannot be used for civil enforcement."

(UP&L brief p. 47)

Emery

Mining assumes that proposition when it argues that the Subpoena
Powers Act contains no standards to prohibit the improper use of
evidence gathered in criminal investigations.
23-24)

(Emery brief pp.

Both rely on federal cases arising under Rule 6(a),

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as authority for that
proposition.
Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is an
elaborate set of restrictions and requirements associated with
the recording of and disclosure of proceedings and matters
occurring before federal grand juries.
Utah law.

It has no counterpart in

Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-9(4), (5), (6) and Utah Code

Ann. § 77-11-10 deal with the secrecy requirements imposed in
Utah grand jury proceedings but in none of the detail contained
in Rule 6(e). There is no provision for disclosure of matters
occurring before grand juries on a showing of particularized
need, for example.
The most recent and most important cases dealing with
the use of matters occurring before a federal grand jury in civil
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cases are United States v. Sells Engineerngr cited by Emery
Mining, and its companion case, United States v. Baggott. supra.
While Emery would have the court believe that Sells is authority
for the proposition that evidence obtained by a federal grand
jury may never be used in civil actions, neither Sells nor
Baggott say anything of the sort.

In Sells, supra, the Supreme

Court simply forbade the automatic disclosure of grand jury
materials allowed under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i). Disclosure to
justice department civil division attorneys could be had,
however, under Rule 6 (e)(3) (C)(i), that is, when directed by a
court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding, on a showing of particularized need.

Id., 3144-3149.

In Baggottf the Supreme Court merely held that an IRS
tax audit was not preliminary to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) and therefore
disclosure of grand jury materials to the IRS could not properly
be ordered.

Id., 3166-3169.

Nowhere in the language of either

case is there a statement of the general rule postulated by Utah
Power and Light and Emery.

Indeed, in addition to

misinterpreting Sells and the other cases they cite on this
point, respondents miss the critical significance of these cases:
they involve grand juries, federal grand juries specifically.
None of the cases cited control in any way the conduct of affairs
under the Subpoena Powes Act.
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Utah Power and Light's statement that "it is beyond
dispute that there are extraordinary instances in which limited
information from a criminal investigation properly may be
authorized to be used in a civil action/1 (UP&L brief, p. 48)
goes much too far.

It goes much further than Sells, supra, or

Baggott, supra, permit.

Nothing in either of the cases applies

to criminal investigations generally as Utah Power and Light's
statement boldly implies.

Only when a federal grand jury is

involved does the structure described by Rule 6(e) and
interpreted by ££UL£r supra, and Baggott, supra, and the other
federal cases cited by respondents, have any meaning.

Evidence

obtained by federal criminal investigators independent of a grand
jury even if presented to a grand jury after it is collected, can
be disclosed and used in civil cases without consequences.

See

In re Grand Jucy_Matter (Garden COiJrt Nosing BQTOfci IncJ, 6 97
F.2d 511, 516 (3d Cir. 1982) (Garth, J., concurring) ("when
testimony or data is sought for its own sake—for its intrinsic
value in furtherance of a lawful investigation—rather than to
learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid
defense to disclosure that the same information is revealed to a
grand jury or that the same documents had been, or were presently
being, examined by a grand jury.'1); United States

iu~In£&LSl£te

Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1960); SEC v.
Dresser Industries Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
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In re Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey state Commission of
Investigation) . 630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1980) , cert. d£H. 449

u.s. 1081 (1981); United States v, Stanford, 589 F.2d 285f 291
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. d£u. 440 U.S. 983 (1979); In re Grand Jury
Matter (Catania). 682 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Grand
Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980); In re
Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978); £££
v. Everest Management Corporation. 87 F.R.D. 100, 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
Furthermore, Utah Power and Light's statement that:
. . . the use of such evidence [evidence
obtained in a criminal investigation] is
permitted only after a showing of
particularized need which necessarily
means the practice is not favored, . . .
(UP&L brief, pp. 48-49).
is meaningless unless it refers solely to the disclosure of
matter occurring before a grand jury as authorized by Rule 6(e),
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Certainly, as discussed above, disclosure of evidence
obtained outside the grand jury for use in any way seen fit by
the government, including civilly, is not forbidden or unusual or
disfavored.

The statement has no origin in state law.

meaning insofar as Utah grand juries are concerned.

It has no

None of

Utah's grand jury statutes say anything about disclosure on
particularized need.

It is most significant that the statement

has no application at all when it comes to matter obtained or
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gathered as a result of a state criminal investigation conducted
without the aid of a grand jury.

While the secrecy provisions of

the Subpoena Powers Act have some of the trappings associated
with grand juries, an investigation conducted using the devices
allowed by the Act, is, simply stated, not a grand jury
investigation or a grand jury proceeding.

The secrecy that can

be ordered by a court for the purposes set out in the Act is not
the secrecy required of grand jury proceedings in Utah.

The

State contends that any order imposed by a district court
pursuant to § 77-22-2(3) can be lifted by that court for any
reason not forbidden by the statute, including so that evidence
obtained in the criminal investigation might be used in civil
proceedings.
Analogizing the conduct of affairs under the Act to the
conduct of a grand jury investigation is illustrative, not
controlling.

It is helpful for this Court to look at cases and

statutes dealing with the rights of targets before state grand
juries or before federal grand juries for guidance in enumerating
what warnings or protections must be afforded those subpoenaed or
required to produce evidence pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act
Similarly, cases dealing with the scope of grand jury criminal
investigations are illustrative of how far investigators might go
with the tools the Act gives them.

The Court is not, however,

bound by any rule or statute governing the grand jury when
interpreting Section 77-22-1, et seq.
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Calling the statute Utah's "Mini Grand Jury Act" was
convenient for the Court in KUTV v, Conderr 635 P.2d 412 (1981)
but was mistaken.

The Subpoena Powers Act does not create a mini

grand jury in any sense of the word.

It merely authorizes the

use of subpoenas to compel production and testimony in aid of
criminal investigations.

The act should not be tied to the

statutes governing Utah grand juries simply because at one point
in time a court felt it useful to tag it with the misnomerf "Mini
Grand Jury Act."
The evidence obtained by use of the subpoenas
authorized by the Subpoena Powers Act, is not for any reason
articulated by any of the respondents foreclosed from use in
civil proceedings brought before, contemporaneous with, or after
the filing of criminal charges in this case, regardless of
whether the same attorneys are involved in both the civil and
criminal cases.

If, perhaps, the cases had been brought in

federal court and the evidence used to obtain an indictment from
a grand jury was developed using the grand jury, the propriety of
using the same evidence in a companion civil case or the wisdom
of employing the same attorneys to do both the civil and criminal
cases would be at issue under the rules of iLelLs, supra, and
Baggott. supra, but that is not the case.

The law governing the

federal grand jury does not apply in this case.
not prohibit what has been done.
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State law does

No reason that can be found in

state or federal constitutional law prohibits what was done.
Respondents simply have no authority for their position that the
act is either defective in some way because it does not forbid
the use of evidence obtained by subpoena under the Act in
companion civil cases or because the act was abused in some way
because evidence that was subsequently used in a companion civil
case came into the hands of criminal investigators involved in a
criminal investigation through.
POINT IV
THOSE SUBPOENAED UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COUNTY ATTORNEYS
PURSUANT TO THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT NEED NOT
BE AFFORDED THE SAME PROTECTION ALLOWED THOSE
SUBPOENAED TO APPEAR BEFORE A UTAH GRAND
JURY.
A.

The State contends that the Subpoena Powers Act is

not a grand jury statute.

It provides the Attorney General and

the County Attorneys with an investigative tool; the
investigative subpoena.

There is no greater reason to require

that witnesses subpoenaed under the Act be afforded anything more
in terms of constitutional protection than other witnesses
involved in a criminal matter or suspects or targets of ordinary
criminal investigations.

The magic attributed to the grand jury

by respondents does not exist in reality.
the

The grand jury is not

,,

buffer,, respondents would like this court to believe it is.

Practically speaking, the target of a criminal investigation
conducted in part as authorized by the Subpoena Powers Act, who

-33-

becomes a defendant in a criminal information filed on evidence
developed through the use of subpoenas obtained under Section 7722-2 is probably better protected by the preliminary examination
required by Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, than he
would ever be as a defendant under indictment returned by a state
grand jury.

Respondents fail to acknowledge that following a

grand jury indictment, there is no intervening protection for an
accused before trial.
The logical end of respondents' arguments about the
adequacy of protection afforded a target of an investigation
under the Subpoena Powers Act to compel appearance and the
production of documents and other evidence is that trial by
information would be improper and forbidden in any case because
the protection afforded those charged by information and those
indicted is not precisely the same.
tried on indictment.
case.

Everyone would have to be

Grand juries would be required in every

That they reach this conclusion is not surprising, since

they misinterpret the Subpoena Powers Act to allow an
"accusatory" process.
We know, however, that prosecution by information in
Utah is constitutional.

Maxwell v. Dow. 19 Utah 495, 57 P. 412,

affirmed 176 U.S. 581, 44 L.Ed. 597, 20 S.Ct. 448 (1900).
is no due process or equal protection problem in trial by
information.

There is no adequate reason articulated by

-34-

There

respondents that investigation conducted with the help of
investigative subpoenas rather than should fare differently in
constitutional analysis than investigation conducted by a grand
jury pursuant to its subpoena power.
The need to warn one that he is a target of an
investigation has roots not so much in grand jury practice, but
in the notions of voluntariness, knowledge and the intelligent
exercise of one's constitutional rights in the face of the
government's efforts to detect and punish crime.

Concededly,

these warnings must be given when required in order for the
evidence obtained thereby to be of any value at all in subsequent
proceedings.

They would be required, of course, whenever the

issue of the voluntary, intelligent or knowing waiver of a
constitutionally protected right was at stake.

Warning one that

he is a target of an investigation is of some benefit in that
regard.

Advising a witness of his right to have counsel with him

is also helpful.

Disclosing to the target the nature of the

charges being investigated might also be necessary to insure that
voluntary, intelligent and knowing waivers occurred.

Whether

full blown Miranda warnings ought to be given or whether anything
more or less would be acceptable ought to depend on the
circumstances in each case.

For those who are not targets of an

investigation, warnings are essentially meaningless.

For those

who are targets at the time they produce the evidence or are
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compelled to provide statements, the warnings guarantee that they
are on notice of what is at stake for them.

For those who become

targets after having produced protected or privileged information
whether disclosures or admissions or other vital and protected or
privileged material were made or delivered up voluntarilyf
intelligently or without adequate notice and knowledge under the
circumstances can be determined on motions to suppress the
evidence if the target becomes a defendant in a criminal
proceeding in which the prosecution seeks to use the items and
information furnished as evidence against the defendant.
There is simply no compelling reason and no reason
articulated by the respondents for carving out special rules
relating to warnings or targets insofar as the Subpoena Powers
Act is concerned.

Again, the analogy of the Act to a Utah State

grand jury need not be taken to absurd extremes.
The differences between the grand jury process and the
process of investigation under the Subpoena Powers Act also shows
the fallacy in Emery's argument that the Act violates separation
of powers principles.

Besides the fact that this argument was

never raised in the district court, the Act does not convert the
prosecutor into an extension of the functions of the judicial
branch of government.

The Act is simply a tool to allow

investigation of crime, following which the prosecutor may decide
to file criminal charges - both of which are proper functions of
the executive branch of government.
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POINT V.
THIS COURT CAN REQUIRE THAT THE SUBPOENA
POWERS ACT BE USED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT
WITH RIGHTS THAT EXIST INDEPENDENT OF THE
STATUTE.
Colby, Stott and Maxfield contend that the Act is
defective because its specific language does not require
investigators to warn or advise witnesses or targets of rights
already granted them or already guaranteed them under the
Constitution as interpreted by the courts.

In order to accept

their argument, one must concede that a statute, particularly one
like the Act, has to incorporate in its language all of the
protection already available to suspects or witnesses in ordinary
criminal investigations under both the state and federal
constitutions and cases like Miranda, Escobedo, and the like.
Respondents cite no authority for that proposition.

Indeed, to

require that to occur before a statute can be found adequate
would not only be unnecessary but would involve an incredible
waste of time and effort.

The simple answer, is to allow the Act

to be read side by side with Miranda and every other case or
statute that might apply as the circumstances warrant.
No authority cited by any of the respondents requires
that a statute incorporate in its language every right one might
exercise or be entitled to in relation to a statute's use or
application.
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Nothing in any of the respondents1 briefs suggests that
this court lacks the power to interpret the Act in light of
rights which exist independent of the statute.

The respondents,

in fact, ask the Court on nearly every page of their briefs to
read the Act in light of established constitutional principles
and individual rights.

This Court can, the State contends,

assure constitutional application of the Subpoena Powers Act by
instructing those who will be using its provisions on the rights
and privileges which must be protected or observed in its
application.

By doing so, it is not adding what the legislature

left out or redrafting the statute in any way.

A reading of the

statute reveals no prohibition against advising one that he is a
target of an investigation.

Though the statute does not require

same, in specific language, none of the authorities cited by the
respondents, none of their arguments, and none of their reasoning
suggests that the Court could not determine that in order for
anyone who is a target of an investigation which uses subpoenas
obtained under Section 77-22-2 to compel testimony or the
production of evidence, to act voluntarily, knowingly or
intelligently he must be given notice that he is a target and be
advised of what other rights the court believes are necessary for
that to happen.

Nothing prohibits the court from suggesting

sanctions if the warnings are not given just like the Supreme
Court did in the case of custodial police interrogation in
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Miranda.

Nothing is being added to the statute.

The Subpoena

Powers Act is not being rewritten, nor is its language being
interpreted.

The statute is simply being read by the court in

light of and in the context of the already existing body of
criminal and constitutional law.
of this Court.

That is precisely the function

Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah, 1974),

cited by Colby, Stott and Maxfield, is precisely on point:

the

Subpoena Powers Act should not be determined unconstitutional
because a sensible interpretation of in the context suggested
does allow it some practical effect.

Likewise, the Act is

entitled to the presumption of validity precisely because it can
be read as suggested.
POINT VI
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
"ONE SUBJECT1' PROVISION OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
Respondents Maxfield, Stott, and Colby through their
counsel Donald B. Holbrook, have suggested that the Subpoena
Powers Act violates Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah
Constitution.

This section provides in part:

l

". . . Except

general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more
than one subject. . . . H
Respondents fail to point to any portion of the Act
which they claim violates the foregoing provision or even to
explain why the cited Constitutional provision is applicable.
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Further, Judge Bunnell's ruling holding the Act
unconstitutional makes absolutely no reference to the Act being
defective for the reasons which respondents, Maxfield, Stott and
Colby suggest.

Neither these respondents nor any others ever

suggested that this constitutional provision had any application
to the Subpoena Powers Act.
CONCLUSION
Respondents simply do not want to be investigated
regardless of the means imployed.

They fear the traditional

means of challenging criminal evidence, that is, the suppression
hearing, even though available to them if or when they are
charged with criminal conduct, because they cannot articulate,
indeed have not articulated in any of their pleadings or
arguments, in any but the most sweeping and general terms, how
they are improperly affected by the use of means provided under
the Act or by the information or evidence sought pursuant to the
subpoenas.

Likewise, they have not and cannot articulate for

this Court why the ordinary means of protecting people from
investigative or prosecutorial abuse, that is, the quashal of
subpoenas, the exclusion of evidence, the dismissal of an
indictment or information because of prosecutorial abuse, or
other sanctions based on the abuse of the power of the
prosecutor, will not work if they succeed in showing that such
abuse has occurred in this or in any other case.
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Because they

are unable to do any of this, they obfuscate and confuse the
issues with irrelevant analysis.

As discussed in this response,

the simple analysis of the Subpoena Powers Act is the best and
the most appropriate in this case.

It is not and never was

designed to be a grand jury statute.

The requirements imposed on

grand jury proceedings do not apply.

The protection of those

identified as targets of criminal investigations which use the
tools given them by the Act do not have their origin and are not
grounded in the rights afforded those who are witnesses before or
targets of a grand jury investigation but are founded in the
basic principles of due process, that is to say, those who are
identified as targets of investigations before they can
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive any right against
self incrimination, or waive any right to have counsel present or
waive any other constitutionally protected right must be advised
of their target status and given whatever other information under
the circumstances is necessary to put them on adequate notice.
The State concedes that that must be done when
appropriate.

It is not, however, in the State1s view,

appropriate in every case of every witness subpoenaed pursuant to
Selction 77-22-1.

To require that would destroy the

effectiveness of the investigation, would be burdensome, would be
unnecessary, and would serve absolutely no purpose.

To disclose

anything more than the charges or the nature of the charges being
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investigated would be an unreasonable imposition on those
conducting the investigation and would jeopardize the integrity
of the investigation by permitting those who are so inclined to
tamper with evidence, obstruct justice, or collaborate on stories
to confuse, misdirect or divert the attention of an ongoing
investigation.

The secrecy provisions provided by the

legislature in 77-22-2(3) are designed precisely to avoid that
result, and as well, to protect those who are innocent of
criminal wrongdoing from public aprobrium.
The remedies available in case of abuse are plentiful
and are adequate to deal with all of the problems identified by
respondents in their briefs.
The simple fact as far as is that the Act does not
suffer from constitutional or legal deficiencies.

It, like any

other statute, can and probably will at some time in the future
be applied in a way that might violate someone's rights.

The

fact that it might be abused or that it will be abused or that it
has been abused or that the authority granted pursuant to it has
been abused does not logically, legally or any other way require
a conclusion that the statute is legally or constitutionally
defective.

What it does do is require an analysis of the

remedies available to correct abuse.
as exist are adequate.

As stated, those remedies

That can be taken up by criminal

defendants charged with criminal offenses in hearings, the
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purpose of which is to examine specific evidence and determine
whether it should be suppressed because a showing is made that
rights were violated that should have been observed or protected,
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